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‘THE TOWN IS SURROUNDED:’ 
FROM CLIMATE CONCERNS TO 
LIFE UNDER WIND TURBINES IN 
LA VENTOSA, MEXICO





The Isthmus of Tehuantepec region of southwest 
Oaxaca, Mexico, known locally as the Istmo, was 
identified in 2003 as a prime site for wind energy 
development.  Supported by climate change mitiga-
tion legislation, a ‘wind rush’ engulfed the Istmo. 
Now, La Ventosa sits surrounded by high-tension 
wires and wind turbines, some only 280 meters from 
homes.  This paper argues that new valuations of 
wind resources based on market mechanisms and an-
thropogenic climate change laws are intensifying the 
destructive trajectory of the industrial economy. There 
are benefits for land owners and political authorities, 
and what amounts to token civil works projects for 
the town. But the majority of people interviewed 
expressed dissatisfaction towards the existence of wind 
parks surrounding the town. Instead of collective 
benefits, the wind parks brought different degrees of 
health concerns, enormous increases in land, rent, 
food, and electricity prices, as well as insecurity. The 
findings here demonstrate that wind energy devel-
opment, encouraged by climate change mitigation 
policies, is intensifying pre-existing trends towards 
inequality and poverty in La Ventosa. Meanwhile, 
the destructive operations of the global industrial 
economy are renewed, using market-based approaches 
to mitigating anthropogenic climate change.
Key Words: La Ventosa; Wind Energy; Sustain-
able Development; Land Control; Climate Change; 
Green Grabbing
‘El pueblo está rodeado:’ De preocupaciones 
climáticas a la vida bajo turbinas eólicas en La 
Ventosa, México
Resumen
El Istmo de la región de Tehuantepec en el sudoeste 
de Oaxaca, México, conocido localmente como el 
Istmo, fue identificado en 2003 como un sitio ideal 
para el desarrollo de la energía eólica. Con el apoyo de 
la legislación para la mitigación del cambio climático, 
una “ráfaga de viento” envolvió el Istmo. Ahora, La 
Ventosa se encuentra rodeada de cables de alta tensión 
y turbinas eólicas, algunas a sólo 280 metros de los 
hogares. Este artículo argumenta que las nuevas val-
oraciones de recursos eólicos basadas en mecanismos 
de mercado y leyes antropogénicas sobre el cambio 
climático están intensificando la trayectoria destruc-
tiva de la economía industrial. Hay beneficios para 
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los propietarios de tierras y las autoridades políticas, 
además de lo que equivale a proyectos de obras civiles 
simbólicas para la ciudad. Pero la mayoría de las 
personas entrevistadas expresaron su descontento por 
la existencia de parques eólicos que rodean la ciudad. 
En lugar de beneficios colectivos, los parques eólicos 
trajeron diferentes grados de preocupaciones de salud, 
aumentos enormes en los precios de la tierra, del 
alquiler, de los alimentos y de la electricidad, así como 
la inseguridad. Los hallazgos aquí demuestran que el 
desarrollo de la energía eólica, alentado por las políticas 
de mitigación del cambio climático, está intensificando 
las tendencias preexistentes hacia la desigualdad y la 
pobreza en La Ventosa. Mientras tanto, se renuevan 
las operaciones destructivas de la economía industrial 
mundial, utilizando enfoques basados  en el mercado 
para mitigar el cambio climático antropogénico.
Palabras clave: La Ventosa; Energía eólica; 
Desarrollo sostenible; Control de la tierra; Cambio 
climático; Agarre verde
‘Not everything that shines is gold’ Etelvina 
Valdivieso
Situated on an arid plain, marked by scattered 
hills, and clumps of vegetation, La Ventosa is a small 
town in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec region of Oaxaca, 
Mexico, known locally as the Istmo (Figure 1). With 
a population of just over 4,000, La Ventosa translates 
as ‘the windy place.’ It sits where the Sierra Madre 
mountain range tapers and atmospheric pressure dif-
ferentials between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific 
Ocean allow a powerful north wind to blow through 
the region. In 2003, a USAID-sponsored report, 
Wind Energy Resource Atlas of Oaxaca, mapped and 
confirmed this ‘excellent wind resource’ (Elliott, et al., 
2003: iv), leading the International Finance Corpora-
tion (IFC, 2014: 1) to exclaim that the region has 
‘the best wind resources on earth.’ The Istmo would 
soon experience a ‘wind rush’ (Vance, 2012), and 
by January 2015 would have 1,608 wind turbines 
(Rivas, 2015). La Ventosa was the second town to be 
consumed by industrial-scale wind turbines after La 
Venta, which hosted the first wind pilot project in 
1994, followed by a Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)-sponsored wind park, La Venta II, in 2007. 
Eventually La Ventosa would be engulfed by wind 
turbines and electrical infrastructure that would 
enclose roughly 80-95 per cent of the town. 
Political ecologists have shown how development 
projects that disregard local concerns and power 
dynamics can create ecological distribution conflicts 
(Martínez-Alier, 2002). These arise from local power 
inequalities, unequal distribution of benefits and 
negative environmental impacts. Maarten Wolsink 
(2000) among others (Devine-Wright, 2005; 
Pasqualetti, 2011; Oceransky, 2011) demonstrated the 
importance of local stakeholder participation and how 
top-down approaches invite resistance to wind energy 
development. Similarly, Christos Zografos and Joan 
Martínez-Alier (2009) document a ‘centre-periphery’ 
dynamic with wind park construction in Catalonia. 
Outside wind developers profited from expropriating 
access to land and wind resources at a cheap price. 
Meanwhile local people are left feeling ripped off, 
excluded and stuck with the environmental changes 
brought by the wind project. In general, people living 
around wind energy sites are faced with carrying the 
costs of the developers ambitions (Pasqualetti, 2011), 
which can be compounded by ecosystem disruption, 
unequal benefit sharing, political corruption and 
export-oriented development models (Martinez-Alier, 
2002; Zografos and Martínez-Alier, 2009). Further-
more, Bakker and colleagues (2012: 48) write: ‘People 
who live close to wind turbines and do not benefit 
economically, will be at risk to experience sleep distur-
bance and psychological distress.’ The way land deals 
and development projects—wind or otherwise—are 
constructed have significant psycho-political and 
geographical effects on populations, which can create 
social conflict, long-term resentment or even social 
immiseration.
Ecological distribution conflicts are intimately 
tied up with the notion of green grabbing. Emerging 
from new valuations of natural resources that are 
legitimizing and incentivizing new resource appro-
priations, green grabbing involves transfers of the 
control of land and/or natural resources to powerful 
actors by various means using an environmental 
ethic or rational (Fairhead et al., 2012: 254). Land 
and resource transfers involve various forms of 
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international, national and local level collaboration, 
utilizing a diversity of coercive and/or deceptive 
tactics to achieve resource control (Borras et al., 2012; 
Wolford et al., 2013; Holmes, 2014).  Green grabbing 
represents the proliferation of ecological distribution 
conflicts arising from new economic valuations of 
natural resources. These are actively ‘rolling out’ new 
policy by various national and international actors to 
sustain the growth of the industrial economy related to 
ecosystem and climate commodity markets (Dunlap 
and Fairhead, 2014). This paper argues that new valu-
ations of wind resources based on market mechanisms 
and anthropogenic climate change laws are advancing 
and intensifying environmental and social pressures on 
rural populations. La Ventosa emerges as an interest-
ing case of green grabbing illustrating, at a local level, 
the complications of wind energy centric 
land grabbing, while also at an international 
level, the dishonest and damaging ecologi-
cal behaviour encouraged by climate change 
mitigation initiatives.
Providing some background on green 
economic policy in Mexico and the wind 
parks surrounding La Ventosa, this paper 
examines the arrival, the politics, and the 
social and ecological changes generated 
by wind energy development. Wind 
energy projects in the Istmo, it is argued, 
are advancing destructive political and 
economic trends in La Ventosa, which are 
symptomatic of larger international neolib-
eral and climate change policies. La Ventosa 
wind energy projects empower and entrench 
existing trends of political corruption, 
income-inequality and work-related out-migration 
while, at the international level, are legitimizing and 
intensifying the destructive profit oriented trajectory 
of the industrial economy, in the name of redressing 
climate and ecological crisis.
This paper emerges from a larger project investi-
gating wind energy development in the region, based 
on participant observation and involving sixty-six 
recorded semi-structured interviews collected between 
4 February and 4 May 2015 in La Ventosa. Interviews 
were conducted with people critical of wind energy 
eager to discuss their experiences, in addition to 
walking door-to-door through the town asking if 
people would share their thoughts about the wind 
turbines. Research participant confidentiality, espe-
cially given the controversial issue of wind energy in 
the region, is particularly important. Research partici-
pants are referred to by genders, or as a broad identity 
descriptor—for example ‘land owner,’ ‘woman’ or 
by fake names. This research was conducted with 
an interpreter, who appears in the text as a ‘friend’ 
because during this research they became more than 
interpreter. The next section begins by providing 
policy and wind park background in La Ventosa, 
before moving into the arrival of the wind energy 
project and the subsequent issues that emerged during 
conversations and interviews. 
From Structural Adjustment to Market Based 
Environmentalism
While Mexico has become well-known for its 
politically repressive and Dirty War style conditions 
in the country (AI, 2015; Paley, 2014, 2015), ironi-
cally, it is also amongst the countries adopting the 
most comprehensive anthropogenic climate change 
legislation. Repressive and progressive trends are both 
contained within economic liberalization programs 
in the country. Receiving thirteen structural adjust-
ment loans from the World Bank in 1980-1991 
Fig 1 Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Adopted by author from University of Texas Libraries
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(Paley, 2014), Mexico was faced with a barrage of 
neoliberal programs, that have continued and also 
intertwined with environmental legislation and wind 
energy development (UNEP, 2015). Three notable 
policies laid the foundation for the Oaxacan wind 
rush:
First was the revision of Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution in 1992 that created the 
possibility of privatizing social property—ejidos and 
communal land (Stephen, 2002: 62-7). Ejidos are 
lands designated for agricultural and residential use, 
governed by local assemblies, a comisariado (collective 
land commissioner) and made up of recognized 
community members,1 while communal lands 
(terrenos comunales) are related to pre-colonial land 
claims and are governed by varying rules according to 
regional customs (Binford, 1985). 
Second was the 1992 electricity law that contains 
a notion of ‘self-supply’ (autoabastecimiento) that 
allows companies to buy and manage their own energy 
generation sites. This has been criticized as a profitable 
‘loophole’ for energy companies (WDM, 2011: 8). 
Third was the notorious 1994 North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) stating, in Section 
6, that ‘an enterprise may acquire, establish, and/
or operate an electrical generating facility in Mexico 
to meet the enterprise’s own supply needs’ (USAID, 
2009: 2). 
These policy changes opening up collective lands, 
privatizing energy generation and allowing it to go 
transnational, provided incentives for foreign direct 
investment (FDI)—green or otherwise—in Mexico. 
Recently, President Peña Nieto has taken this process 
further with the 2013 Petroleum and Federal Electric 
Utility Act. Despite militant opposition (Gonzalez, 
2014), this legislation privatized the two largest public 
firms in Mexico, PEMEX and the Federal Electricity 
Commission (CFE), mandating that social property 
or other land holders must negotiate and eventu-
ally surrender their land to private energy companies. 
The results of this legislation are yet to be seen, but 
1 That was traditionally all-male.
researchers anticipate an increase in social conflict 
(Payan and Correa-Cabrera, 2014).
This trajectory of economic liberalization has di-
versified, extending to develop green economic policy 
and initiatives. Wind energy has become an important 
element in climate change legislation, with the United 
Nations calling to ‘accelerate the deployment of 
all renewable technologies including onshore and 
off-shore wind’ and developing ‘specific policies and 
business models to support them (e.g., feed-in tariffs 
and public auctions); and the removal of barriers to 
large-scale renewables’ (UN, 2012: 22). This has made 
the Istmo an important national asset for Mexico, 
which has become a leader in promoting a green 
economy and climate change legislation. This includes 
the Renewable Energy and Energetic Transition Law 
(2008), mandating that thirty-five per cent of electric-
ity will come from renewable resources by 2020, forty 
per cent by 2040 and fifty per cent by 2050. This is 
also backed by the Special Climate Change Program 
(2009-2012) and the General Law on Climate 
Change (2012) which seeks to reduce emissions by 
thirty percent based on year 2000 emission levels by 
2020 and fifty percent by 2050. This plan is known as 
the 10-20-40 vision, and according to Secretariat of 
Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT, 
2013: 9) seeks to turn
this great [climate change] challenge into 
an opportunity to conserve and sustainably 
use its natural capital; to take advantage of 
its vast potential to develop clean energies; 
to correct inefficiencies in the use of energy; 
to generate jobs within a green economy; to 
promote sustainable territorial development; 
to increase competitiveness, and to improve 
public health and quality of life.
Turning the problem into a solution, this country-
wide trajectory to develop a green economy was solidi-
fied by the General Law of Climate Change (LGCC), 
which institutionally supports and mandates the 
expansion of renewable or ‘clean’ energy. According 
to the LGCC this will be accomplished by ‘an 
incentive-based system, which promotes and allows 
for profitable electricity generation through renewable 
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energy such as wind, sun, and small hydro’ that seeks 
to meet Mexico’s  goal to generate 35 per cent of its 
electricity from clean sources by 2024 (LGCC, 2012: 
65; SCCP, 2014). Such an ‘incentive-based system’ 
refers to market-based environmentalism which 
(Corson et al., 2013), after the Kyoto Protocol (1997), 
became the principal approach to mitigating climate 
change and biodiversity loss (Dunlap and Fairhead, 
2014). Mexico has been ambitious in creating a green 
economy and legislating climate change laws, which 
continue with The Special Climate Change Program 
2014-2018. The Mexican government has become a 
leader in climate change legislation, and is aggressively 
working to establish a green economy, and incentivize 
investments in the area of renewable energy. However, 
the question remains: will these measures adequately 
mitigate, let alone address, the political and economic 
system responsible for driving and reproducing 
ecological crises and climate change? The case of La 
Ventosa provides an insightful example.
La Ventosa Wind Parks: The Green Economy, 
Investors and Energy Use
Wind park planning in La Ventosa began in 
the late 1980s with the first commercial project 
completed in 2009. This was the Parques Ecológicos 
de México (80 Mega Watt (MW) built by the 
Spanish companies Iberdrola and Gamesa. This 
development continued in 2010 with the comple-
tion of two wind parks: the Bii Nee Stipa I-III (‘El 
Retiro’) (74 MW) by Gamesa and the La Mata and 
La Ventosa Wind Park (65.7 MW) by the Électricité 
de France (EDF). Three other parks were completed 
in 2012: Fuerza Eólica del Istmo 1a (30 MW) and 
2a (50 MW) by General Electric Wind and the Stipa 
Naaya (74 MW) park by Gamesa (Mejía, 2014). In 
the Istmo, the wind turbines are typically tri-blade, 
sitting on 80 meter towers rooted in a concrete foun-
dation 7-14 meters (23-45 ft.) deep and about 16-21 
meters (52-68 ft.) in diameter.2 The figures fluctuate 
outside these ranges depending on the project site. 
For example, in La Ventosa, wind turbine founda-
tions are 11.5 meters deep, while the Barra de Santa 
Teresa in the southern coastal Istmo, which consist of 
2 There are also wind turbines north of La Ventosa there is a 
set of wind turbines with towers 150 meters (492 ft.) tall.
sand and vegetation, fishermen claim to have seen a 
foundation depth of 70 meters.3
The International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA) estimates that a 20 MW wind farm costs a 
total of $44.7 million (IRENA, 2015: 58). Construc-
tion costs are always negotiable and depend on the 
local political, economic and environmental contexts 
of project sites. The La Mata and La Ventosa wind 
park became the World Bank’s leading Clean Technol-
ogy Fund (CTF) in Mexico (WDM, 2011). CTF is 
the largest of the World Bank’s Climate Investment 
Funds (CIFs) established by G8 donor countries, and 
designed to support low-carbon technologies and 
encourage ‘clean’ investments. The World Bank invests 
in other wind energy projects 30 minutes down the 
highway from la Ventosa, with the La Venta II (USD 
12.9 million loan) and III ($25 million grant) wind 
parks (WDM, 2011). The La Mata and La Ventosa 
project received loans from the CTF (USD 15 million 
concessional loan), the IFC (USD 23.68 million), 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (USD 
21.01 million), and Export-Import Bank ($80.667 
million) with the project totaling $151.84 million 
(WDM, 2011). This wind park was registered with 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
is projected to generate 1,179, 195 certified emissions 
reduction credits (CERs) over the next seven years 
and has been ‘forward sold’ to EDF Trading giving 
it the possibility to gain over USD 40 million from 
the CDM (CDM, 2006; WDM, 2011: 11). Despite 
problems with democratic participation and oversight 
with the CDM (Newell, 2014), it has helped reduced 
the risk to investors, realizing the profitability of wind 
energy generation and renewing the operations of 
transnational corporations. 
The Mexican government created openings to 
establish a profitable renewable energy market in 
Mexico. This gained the attention of Danish (Vestas), 
Spanish (Iberdrola, Gamesa, Marña Revonables/Eólica 
del Sur) and United States (Clipper) wind companies, 
while also giving rise to a series of limited liability 
companies. In the case of La Mata and La Ventosa 
Wind Park, Eléctrica del Valle de México (EVM), 
owned by EDF Energies Nouvelles—the renewable 
3 Interview conducted in Álvaro Obregón,  11 May 2015.
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energy arm of Électricité de France (EDF)—heard 
that Wal-Mart wanted to ‘go green,’ approached 
them, and later negotiated a 60 per cent power share 
of the wind park with electricity bought ‘at a price 
that is higher than wholesale, but lower than retail’ 
(WDM, 2011; USAID, 2009: 5). Notably, none of 
the energy generated from these parks surrounding 
La Ventosa are providing electricity to the region 
(WDM, 2011; Juárez-Hernández and León, 2014). 
Instead, based on the self-supply model, these wind 
parks are exporting electricity to other countries 
and investors companies. As early as 2009, the CFE 
had signed agreements to export electricity from the 
Istmo to Belize, Guatemala and California (USAID, 
2009). In addition to Wal-Mart, investors in the sur-
rounding wind parks included: Cemex (the world’s 
largest cement producer), Grupo Bimbo (the world’s 
largest food processing corporation), Grupo Mexico 
and Peñoles—two of Latin America’s largest mineral 
extraction and processing companies (Garcia, 2012). 
Not only does this energy generation relationship 
create an exploitive ‘centre’-‘periphery’ dynamic, as 
outlined by Zografos and Martínez-Alier (2009), 
but wind energy parks around La Ventosa are being 
used to intensify the consumption and production of 
natural resources.  
This exploitative dynamic, combined with claims 
of climate change mitigation, sustainability and 
environmental ethics, emblematic of green grabbing, 
are legitimizing and incentivizing new wind 
resource appropriations and uses. Grupo 
Mexico, the largest mining company in 
Mexico, owns 37 turbines in phases II-III 
of Bii Nee Stipa wind park, proving ‘once 
again,’ in their words, their ‘commitment to 
sustainability and the environment’ (Grupo 
Mexico, 2014: 7; Hristova, 2014). Also 
celebrating their ‘commitment to sustain-
ability and environmental stewardship,’ 
Peñoles (2014: 58) has two self-supply 
wind parks: Fuerza Eólica del Istmo 1a and 
2a in La Ventosa, while it also has a gold 
mine concession of 10,039 hectares with 
Canadian River Resources Inc/Arcus Devel-
opment Group (Chaca, 2015; Biller, 2012; 
RS, 2008) (Figure 2). Initially, Peñoles was a 
principal sponsor in the recently denied Eólica del Sur 
wind park (AMDEE, 2012), where now investments 
have gone north to an 180MW wind park in Coahuila 
(Peñoles, 2014). Wind parks around La Ventosa are 
being used to power mining operations in the name 
of environmental sustainability. These wind parks are 
built on alliances between state, national and large-
scale foreign capital (Borras et al., 2012; Wolford et 
al., 2013), while they also operate in collaboration 
with other industries that are justified with a green 
economic logic of ‘offsetting’ (Sullivan, 2009, 2013a, 
2013b; Seagle, 2012).
Investments in wind energy to ‘offset’ environ-
mental damage continue attempts at rebranding 
mining as ‘sustainable mining’ (Kirsch, 2010), a 
notion that has extended to contradictory notions of 
‘green uranium’ (Sullivan, 2013b: 82). Wind turbines 
are now renewing environmental destruction associ-
ated with extraction and processing industries, propel-
ling industrial growth forward  with new possibilities 
of receiving ‘climate’ and ‘clean’ technology funds 
and loans. Wind energy is being used to advance, 
and not replace, ecologically destructive modes of 
production (Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014), giving 
the opposite impressions marketed to the public by 
wind companies and governments signing climate 
change legislation laws and creating climate funds. 
The green economy attempts to renew not only Wal-
Mart’s, Grupo Mexico’s, and other corporate images 
 
Fig. 2 Wind Parks and Mining Concessions, by Geocomunes, 2014
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as environmentally responsible, but also stimulate 
revenue streams, creating the possibility for continued 
economic and infrastructural expansion. This reality 
concerning  wind energy is largely unacknowledged 
by environmental activists, NGOs (Sierraclub, n.d.; 
Greenpeace, 2015) and even some I ndigenous land 
defenders (Richardson, 2016). Wind energy, and 
renewable energy in general, are positioned by public 
discourse as the solution to anthropogenic ecological 
and climate crisis, which is facilitated by a narrow 
concern and/or fixation with fossil fuels and the 
econometric counting/commodification of carbon. 
Let the case of wind energy development 
and use in La Ventosa cause reflection on 
the negative reality and processes enabled 
with renewable energy generation. 
Wind Turbine Penetration in La 
Ventosa 
Towards the end of my first day con-
ducting door-to-door interviews, my escort, 
friend and I dragged ourselves through the 
San Miguel neighbourhood of La Ventosa. 
Before heading back to the centre of town, 
we came across a vacant high-tension wire 
foundation. The town had already been 
engulfed by electrical infrastructure and 
wind turbines (Figure 3), but I was curious 
why the post remained incomplete. I asked 
our escort what had happened? He explained 
that the government, without prior com-
munication, began building power lines 
straight through the neighbourhood along 
the canal. Soon people started to ask the 
construction workers, ‘what is that thing? 
What are you building?’ The contractors 
told them: ‘We are going to build power 
lines down here,’ pointing across the neigh-
bourhood. Immediately, the people started 
arguing, spreading the word, and came back 
to take over the construction equipment 
and cars belonging to the construction 
company, forcing them to stop working 
and eventually to discontinue the project. 
A line of concrete foundations was left 
behind (Figure 4). The people had stopped 
the project. However, no official talked to them. The 
government did not consult them or consult anyone 
in that neighbourhood, let alone the town. The people 
learned by asking the workers. Through their own will, 
they terminated the construction. If people were not 
proactive, they would have never known about the 
intention to build high-tension wires, adding another 
layer of electrical infrastructure standing over them. 
Nevertheless, after hearing this story, and looking 
around me, standing in a neighbourhood at the centre 
of a wind energy generation site, it became clear that 
these high-tension wire foundations were a metaphor 
Fig. 3 La Ventosa, Mexico by author
Fig. 4 High-tension wire foundation, La Ventosa Photo by Author
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for development in La Ventosa: the people are never 
fully informed, unless they find out and, if need be, 
stop it themselves. Otherwise the projects will proceed 
with minimal care. This section will investigate the 
governing relationship that allowed wind energy parks 
to engulf La Ventosa.
The Cacique: Land Control and Political Dis-
content
Agrarian politics have always involved struggle in 
La Ventosa (Binford, 1985; Rubin, 1997). During in-
terviews it was explained to me that in the 1970s, the 
current cacique in La Ventosa used state force to evict 
the leftist Isthmus Coalition of Workers, Peasants and 
Students (COCEI), activists protesting the privatiza-
tion of communal land through squatting, which is 
now the land where the cacique lives.4 The cacique is 
a powerful local autocratic political boss, who retains 
both local and national client networks of politicians, 
union leaders, business elites and gunmen, making 
them central figures in business in the town. Dona 
explained, ‘[t]he cacique has always had a lot of power, 
he had the PRI government with him and it is still 
like that [today].’ The cacique, along with other PRI 
politicians, was instrumental in conditioning the 
direction of land change in La Ventosa. Between the 
1960s and the 1990s, the town was agriculturally 
centred, specializing in sugar cane, cattle and dairy 
products (Binford, 1985). Agrarian changes came on 
the back of falling oil prices and the 1982 economic 
crash that opened Mexico to structural adjustment 
programs. Meanwhile, the COCEI won elections in 
Juchitán in 1981, were later they would be ousted, 
in 1983, by military occupation, with their political 
activities violently repressed by state and extra-judicial 
PRI forces. This led to cooperation with the PRI in 
regional elections in 1986 as well as with Salinas de 
Gortari’s controversial visit to the Istmo in 1989, 
with the COCEI signing the Pacto de Concertación 
Social (Rubin, 1997), which for many signaled their 
institutional turn and betrayal of their radical roots. 
These macroeconomic, agrarian and political changes 
in La Ventosa set the stage for wind energy develop-
ment. Neoliberalism spread as the COCEI cooperated 
4 This event was recounted in Rubin, 1997 and Howe and 
Boyer, 2015.
after the Pact, taking an ambiguous position towards 
Plan Puebla Panama (2001) and embraced corporate 
chains in Juchitán, such as Bodega Aurrera (Wal-
Mart), as well as the idea of transnational wind energy 
companies (Altamirano-Jiménez, 2014). 
The Istmo in general and La Ventosa in particu-
lar, are governed by a cacique. Acting as a bridge, or 
intermediary, between the transnational companies 
and construction on the ground, the local cacique led 
the way for wind energy development in La Ventosa. 
‘He takes control over everything, he takes advantage 
of the situation before it is put into place,’ explains 
Caballo who continues by recounting the arrival of 
the wind turbines:
He made an announcement at the 
beginning: “anyone who wants to sign a 
contract for a wind project,” and he did not let 
them read the contract. About three hundred 
people came and signed, he said: ‘Bring all of 
your paper work on your land,” but there were 
people there who broke-up that meeting, but 
he is the cacique who is always stealing from 
this town. 
The role and collaboration of the cacique is fun-
damental to receive and facilitate the local politics of 
land control. Borras et al., (2012: 411)  write: ‘The key 
here is that capital is interested in taking hold of land 
resources in order to change the meaning and purpose 
of land use, and there is a wide range of possible 
mechanism to do this.’ In La Ventosa the mechanism 
are long-term land leases for 30 years, which have 
three automatic renewals for 20-30 years. According to 
interviews, land was already concentrated into about 
thirty per cent of the town’s population, causing the 
wind companies, outside the allotted social develop-
ment funds to regional authorities, to largely disregard 
the rest of the population. Guarded by the cacique, 
these land deals were facilitated by another actor—the 
Coyote. One testimony, confirmed by others in the 
town, stated:
They did not start with a forum. First 
some people called Coyotes were brought 
in, they started talking to some people and 
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reserving the land [for wind companies]. They 
convinced the comisariado, they gave him 
money and then they began to say: “They are 
going to grow air, because here you cannot 
grow anything. So you will be harvesting and 
you will have money.” So they had isolated 
meetings called by the cacique or the comisari-
ado and the authority never called a meeting. 
It was isolated. It was done house by house as 
fast as they could. They signed contracts that 
they [the companies] themselves drew up. 
That is how it went.
‘Coyotes’ are middle men from within or outside 
the Istmo who work to secure land for the wind 
companies. Coyotes acquire land at the best possible 
price. Another land owner working with the wind 
companies explains the situation: ‘whoever is well 
prepared will get a good price, but if you are a dumb 
ass, no. He has to negotiate. That is how he gets his 
share.’ The Coyotes methods further complicate the 
politics of green grabbing, creating new grey areas 
in land deals, a kind of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ in land 
acquisition. This officially provides the companies 
plausible deniability when land contract disputes 
surface.  Coyotes were able to negotiate land deals 
using various deceptions: making false/exaggerated 
promises, exploiting illiteracy, indigenous language 
barriers, and ignorance, as well as using intimidation 
techniques (WDM, 2011; Simon, 2013; Juárez-
Hernández and León, 2014). Nonetheless, the Coyote 
created further complications for wind companies. 
Describing the Coyotes as ‘very subtle’ in the way they 
acquired land, Dona explained what happened to her 
cousin:
[who] was told that she was going to get 
20,000 pesos [1,188 USD] to attend some 
talks and sign a piece of paper and she said, 
“20,000 pesos, why are they going to give 
me that?” They were subtle, they went house 
by house, and they always worked individu-
ally — never collectively. They tried to take 
advantage the best they could. In fact it was 
commented in town that people were signing 
the agreements without the beneficiaries 
being listed there. So, the owner would sign 
a contract for 30 years without the beneficiary 
being specified in the contract or an inheritor 
in case the owner died. […] For example […] 
this politician crosses the highway with a piece 
of paper in his hand and says to her [cousin]: 
“sign here, if you want to get 5,000 pesos 
from Iberdrola because she had a contract.” 
And she said, “Yeah that is fine.” She signed 
and the guy said, “I will be back in an hour 
to give you money.” The guy that took the 
paper to her is a lawyer and her cousin; she 
said it was the tenth of May. When she told 
me this, it was not a year later, the 8th of May 
and she had not received a peso…. so we went 
to see Juan Carrasco, representative of the 
wind company—the boss. Then we told the 
guy what had happened and he said, “No, it 
was not 5,000—it was 18,000 [pesos].” She 
said, “But I have not received a single peso.” 
He said, “Well, here is your signature.”  And 
her signature was just three letters and the kid 
had falsified her signature. So that was theft. 
[5] [….] So yes, there were dirty dealings that 
other workers were making.
The wind companies deny working with Coyotes, 
instead calling them ‘political representatives.’ While 
this account likely has other versions, it demonstrates 
the added complications of foreign companies working 
with local collaborators. Notable, however, about this 
process is that unless you are a land owner, politician 
or political representative (Coyote) then you had little 
or no information about the construction of the wind 
turbines. Signing a wind contract created a situation 
where individual choice could have far reaching col-
lective town-wide consequences. 
Another lesser-known technique of acquiring land 
involves marrying into families. An acquaintance told 
me about this happening in Juchitán when I arrived 
in Oaxaca City, which also surfaced in La Ventosa as 
an increase in ‘fatherless children.’ As it was explained, 
lots of foreigners migrate to La Ventosa because of the 
proposed work on wind energy parks, then local ‘girls’ 
fall in love, ‘are seduced’ or have motives of their own 
5 The two people protested until they go their money re-
turned.
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for entering into these relationships. This resulted in 
women marrying people associated with the wind 
energy companies and in La Ventosa, among other 
towns in the Istmo, these marriages have implications, 
providing access to land reserved only for people 
within the community. Discussing this point, a female 
civil servant tells me:
Yeah, in general we know it is an economic 
situation and the companies pay a lot of money, 
no? So if some foreigner is able to marry 
and become a part of some family, he has a 
communal right and they would continue on 
to become land owners. Yeah, we have a case 
like that, we have a case of someone who is 
not from here and they married a young lady 
and they have a residence, they bought a lot of 
land and he is an owner now—he already has 
the rights. 
AD: Is this common? Is there more than 
one case? 
Yes, there are several cases.
AD: Could you give me a rough estima-
tion of how many cases there are?
We can say 5 or 8 eight per cent.
AD: Of people in the wind company or 
people in the town? 
From the companies.
According to interviews this has created an 
abundance of single mothers in La Ventosa after 
wind company employees return home or travel to 
their next construction project. This type of in-and-
out migration created by wind energy development 
had deeply personal and social consequences that 
interviewees blame on the cacique for his collabora-
tion with the wind companies in general and poorly 
negotiating social benefits for the entire town. 
The cacique is repeatedly presented as the puppet 
master behind the curtains. For example the lead 
doctor in La Ventosa, where all the doctors in town 
report, is the nephew of the cacique. People suspect 
that this prevents the distribution of information con-
cerning the negative health impacts arising from living 
in close proximity to wind turbines. Furthermore, the 
political arrangement in La Ventsoa managed by the 
cacique is widely understood as corrupt. Someone 
explained:
By now people have become aware that all 
these politicians just want to get into power. 
The companies are paying money to the town 
hall for projects in the community, but many 
times the mayors will sometimes say: “We 
do not get anything from the companies,” 
but the reality is they are pocketing it all for 
themselves. 
This perspective is taken further when talking 
about political parties in general. When asking a 
different land owner: ‘Do you think the cacique is 
making more money here than the COCEI?’ They 
replied: ‘It’s the same, they negotiate the same. They 
seem to be fighting, but no. They work together under 
the table. COCEI, the PRI, they are all together.’ This 
perspective was repeated innumerably in interviews. 
Nonetheless, while it was noted that the COCEI ‘sold 
out,’ they appear to be fighting for electricity subsidies 
and unpaid taxes from the wind companies (Manzo, 
2015)
In the last couple years, resistance in La Ventosa 
has reignited with a counter-town hall to resist the 
power of the cacique. This counter-political faction 
was able to prove, using photos and video, that the 
cacique and his people were engaging in voting fraud. 
Buying votes, it was explained, was made possible with 
support from the wind companies. They took this to 
the courts in Oaxaca City and Xalapa with little result. 
Nevertheless, they persisted with blockading the 
highway, occupying the city hall and protesting until 
Saúl Vicente, the Mayor of Juchitán, was recounted as 
saying: ‘You can continue going to war or I can offer 
you this tie so there can be peace,’ offering to split 
political control of the town into two factions—the 
cacique and counter- cacique.6
6 Creating ‘parallel offices’ is a classic technique for resolving 
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On my first visit to La Ventosa, a local political 
candidate, giving me a tour of the placement and 
proximity of wind turbines from people’s homes, on 
this trip, explained in an interview that the cacique 
‘is the one who rules the wind energy project and the 
people who raise their voices are intimidated by him, 
but we are not intimidated because we have courage 
to denounce it.’ This faction is largely concerned 
with the failure of social development and benefit-
sharing in the town. While many in the town criticize 
the counter-cacique faction for trying to get wind 
company money allotted to the town hall they still 
provided an important opening for this research. 
Simply put, there was another gang in town. While 
I believe there was a fair amount of self-censorship in 
a number of interviews and encounters as ‘people are 
afraid to talk about the wind turbines because of the 
cacique’ there was a space—an opening with (relative) 
protection so I could conduct census style interviews 
with people in and around both factions. This would 
allow me to learn about the faltering environmental 
and social experiences of living with wind energy in 
La Ventosa.
Ecological and Health Effects
Environmental impacts vary depending on the 
project site. Considering the activism around fossil 
fuels and renewable energy, it must be pointed out 
that every aspect of a wind turbine is derived from 
fossil fuels.  They are largely comprised of various 
types of steel, reinforced concrete foundations that 
consume 150 metric tons of steel for normal building 
conditions, 250 metric tons for the rotor hubs and 
nacelles and 500 metric tons for the towers (WSA, 
2012). An average 2.5 megawatt wind turbine, some 
estimate, consumes 450 metric tons of steel (Smil, 
2016). This also includes fiberglass blades and other 
petroleum products such as plastic components and 
casings, water proofing resins and oil to lubricate the 
blade and hydraulic system (Guezuraga et al., 2013). 
All of these components require mining, oil extrac-
tion, processing, heavy machinery for installation 
and systematic maintenance, as well as transport. The 
dichotomy between fossil fuels and renewable energy, 
political conflict in Mexico (Rubin, 1997: 52)
while a qualitative difference exists, is also surrepti-
tiously misleading.  
Wind turbine installation and operation also 
cause a variety of ecological impacts. This includes the 
clearing of trees and habitat for roads, overhead and 
subterranean power lines, as well as the general need to 
prevent trees from interfering with the turbines (Bessi 
and Navarro, 2014). Similarly, wind turbine founda-
tions are recorded in the area as damaging the water 
table, often resulting in extreme flooding and drying 
that has complicated farming and has led to water wells 
drying up (Dyer, 2009; Navarro and Bessi, 2015). The 
oil used to lubricate the propellers leaks in both old 
and new wind parks in the Istmo (Navarro and Bessi, 
2015). One wind park employee in La Ventosa non-
chalantly admits during an interview: ‘Several of the 
turbines you can see have oil leaks. If you want to go 
out into the sun you could see several—30 or 40 per 
cent are leaking oil.’ Oil then goes into the ground, 
into water wells and onto grass where humans, but 
more commonly cows, can consume it, which results 
in research participants reporting cow infertility and 
deaths in La Ventosa (see also Bessi and Navarro, 
2015). Likewise, as is already well-known, wind parks 
damage bird and bat populations (Ledec et al., 2011; 
Tabassum-Abbasi, et al., 2014), which is combined 
with occasional accidents when wind turbines are over-
whelmed by wind or struck by lightning that results in 
fire. Around La Ventosa there were four different cases 
of wind turbine fires that surfaced in interviews, one 
of which was close to town and reportedly made some 
children sick. The environmental impacts of the wind 
turbines increase when they are located next to water 
and sea life, which is not the case in La Ventosa. 
Extensive health complaints also surfaced in La 
Ventosa. The findings in this research resonated with 
Piermont’s (2009) Wind Turbine Syndrome, which in 
La Ventosa manifested in reports of noise annoyance, 
house vibration, headaches, anxiety, tinnitus, 
dizziness, insomnia and hyper-tension (Simon, 2013). 
The majority of the literature on wind turbine health 
impacts support these findings (Havas and Colling, 
2011; Bakker, et al., 2012; Farboud, et al., 2013; Jeffery 
et al., 2014; Tabassum-Abbasi, et al, 2014; Evans, 
2014), documenting physical and negative psycho-
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social (or emotional) relationships to the political and 
economic processes behind wind energy development 
(Bakker et al., 2012). Unexpectedly, cancer became 
a reoccurring issue with people during and after in-
terviews. Notable was an unsettling interview where 
two police officers who stood by an open window 
during an interview with a doctor who explained ‘it 
is the majority’ of the town that has cancer. Undoubt-
edly cancer’s relationship to wind turbines remains 
undetermined and only one among many factors in 
the town, but the quantity of concerns about cancer 
in interviews in La Ventosa was alarming, requiring 
further attention and independent investigation from 
medical doctors7 and anthropologists. 
Land Change: Inequality, Rural Gentrification 
and Out-Migration
The response of the majority of the people during 
interviews can be summarized as follows: ‘There are 
no real benefits’ for the town, only the land owners 
benefit from the wind projects. Out of sixty-three 
interviewees, forty-seven said there were no social 
benefits, while thirty-six said only the land owners 
benefited. ‘Social benefits’ refers to collective benefits 
achieved for the people as a whole—a community. 
It was not only the land owners who benefited, 
but also political authorities such as the cacique 
and his network of associates. There were at least 
twelve people who felt they were not affected by the 
wind turbines, viewing these projects as generally 
beneficial to the town even if these benefits were 
admittedly limited. The best explanation for selling 
land came from Elder Gato, who said: ‘It is hard to 
steal a wind turbine, but you can steal a cow.’  Elder 
Gato was among at least two other land owners 
who felt grateful for the wind companies, even if 
at moments during the interviews expressed anger 
at the wind company negotiation practices, profit 
sharing (compared with other countries) and a 
lack of information about the ecological impact of 
wind turbines.8 These land owners felt the wind 
7 This includes doctors specializing in Eastern or Chinese 
medicine that account for energy in the body. See Bessi and 
Navarro, 2014.
8 This included a feeling of discrimination and racism, aris-
ing from negotiation practices, attitudes surrounding Zapotec 
companies provided new opportunities for the 
town, themselves and their families, allowing them 
to send their kids to university. The same narrative 
is articulated by Howe and Boyer’s (2015: 35-6) 
‘Don Julio,’ but these findings of appreciation were 
immersed in discontent and at times expressions 
of powerlessness—‘they [the wind turbines] are 
already here, what are we going to do?’ Walking 
around the town, you can see from people’s houses 
and cars—American brand name SUVs and pickup 
trucks—who works with the wind companies, and 
who does not. Benefits from wind energy projects 
included: (temporary) work, (some) paved streets, 
a market centre, the house of culture, painting the 
schools and a soccer field. A mother told me that 
the wind companies helped low-income children 
with painting lessons, Zapotec language classes, and 
summer schools -- not to forget classes about wind 
energy in primary schools as well as technical courses 
at the University of the Istmo to train people in 
electrical engineering. However, many of these civil 
projects, I was told by the counter-cacique faction, 
were achieved through struggle and protest.  
While benefits where real for land owners and 
political leaders, discontent with the wind energy 
projects seemed overwhelming. For example, regarding 
improvements to the schools it was explained:
When Iberdrola was about to enter a 
few years ago they said there would be social 
benefits. This is what the companies said, they 
were socially responsible, and it was even their 
slogan. So the first thing they said was that 
they were going to improve the school because 
the school is 40 years old and it expired 15 
years ago and until now there is no progress. 
The only thing they did was brought two paint 
cans to the school and took a picture and they 
said, “We are supporting education.” They 
brought two footballs; took another picture 
and said, “We are supporting sports.” So there 
is no benefit for this town—there is none. 
life and unequal benefit sharing. James Anaya’s (2015) obser-
vation of the FPIC procedures regarding the next wind park 
projects also commented on this.
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Accounts like these were common. While some 
appreciated the 4-12 blocks of paved roads in the 
town, other felt this was an utter joke—‘[S]o the 
streets were paved, but the only people who benefited 
are those with land.’  Frustrated, Dona points out that 
the running water ‘is not drinkable and they put some 
pavement on the streets, but they did not take care of 
the sewers and the water, they just did things to make 
the town look pretty. At a certain point this hurts 
us.’ Considering the scale of the project, the money 
involved and people’s quality of life, they felt it was 
a change for the worst. At the end of an interview a 
woman summarized: ‘We are still poor and now we 
are surrounded by wind turbines.’
Temporary Work
The work provided by wind companies was met 
with similar attitudes. Those seeking wind park jobs 
were in competition with migrant labourers and other 
specialists who came from overseas to work on the 
wind projects. Work was limited in duration, quantity 
and went to foreigners because of their technical 
expertise (Simon, 2013). Time and again, people 
stressed: ‘They promised work, but nothing—it is 
worse than before’. The jobs available for locals were 
temporary, anywhere from three months to a year 
and a half. Getting work also depended on people’s 
relationship with the cacique and his union 
networks. Repeatedly, I was told that jobs 
became a way of buying votes and silencing 
people. Likewise the idea that ‘[i]f you want 
to keep your job, you have to do everything 
the company says.’ People are even paid, 
according to interviews, 200 pesos to agitate 
and intimidate people critical wind energy at 
the recent free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) consultation that began in Juchitán 
on November 2014.9 
Electricity
Dissatisfaction with work was combined 
with rising electricity prices. Because of land 
9 See Friede and Lehmann, 2016 and Dunlpa, 
Forthcoming for more back ground on the FPIC 
consultation.
use changes for wind turbine construction, La Ventosa 
is now considered an industrial town, which means 
they lose state subsidies and pay industrial prices for 
electricity regardless of living within the power plant 
itself. One man asks: ‘How is it possible that they 
consider us an industrial zone because our region is 
producing energy they are taking to other countries?’ 
Thirty-seven of sixty-three people interviewed were 
completely infuriated by rising electricity bills. ‘I 
feel that we should not have to pay electricity bills in 
this town because we are surrounded by these wind 
turbines,’ says a mother (Figure 5). While another 
person explains:
Every two months the electric bill goes up 
higher.  So when the bill comes in at 800 or 
1,000 pesos the farmer does not have enough 
to pay for that bill. So then the CFE comes 
and cuts off your power because you have not 
paid. Poor people.  If it was generating elec-
tricity our families should be doing well, we 
should be able to enjoy that, but rather there 
is no benefit.
A small sandwich shop owner said they pay 3,000 
pesos every two months, which are big jumps in elec-
tricity bills that risks putting them out of business. 
Another person contends they are paying 1,000 to 
 
Fig. 5 La Ventosa, Photo by Author
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1,200 pesos every two months for electricity in their 
home, a pressure that is justified with the change in 
soil use for wind turbines. Even during an interview, 
I watched in the background as a CFE employee get 
out of a truck, knocked on the neighbour’s door, af-
terwards walking around the property, which I would 
assume is them shutting off the electricity. Then 
during another interview down the street thirty-five 
minutes later, the CFE are still driving around going 
house-to-house and a woman yells: ‘We want light! 
We want light!’ The situation appears disheartening. 
Enclosed by wind turbines, the electricity prices for 
residents are sky rocketing with residents telling me 
that ninety per cent of the jobs made available by wind 
companies have left the town. La Ventosa, like other 
rural towns in Mexico, already had difficulties with 
political corruption, poverty and income-generation, 
but the arrival of wind energy development began 
instigating a type of rural gentrification in the town. 
Rural Gentrification
Two decades and more ago, Martin Philips (1993: 
138) argued that ‘rural studies would appear to lag 
behind urban studies in recognizing the diversity of 
ways one can interpret and understand gentrification.’ 
More recently, Darren Smith (2011: 599) affirms 
this, stressing the increasing resonance of gentrifica-
tion in rural studies. Arising from public regulation 
and private investment, gentrification is a dynamic 
economic process of urban revaluation that creates 
price hikes on space, and by extension property, in 
targeted areas (Lees et al., 2008). Smith (2002: 390) 
makes a call to ‘widen the spatial lens’ of gentrification 
studies, while Davidson and Lees (2005:1170) define 
four foundational characteristics of gentrification: 
(1) reinvestment of capital, (2) social upgrading with 
in-migration of high-income groups, (3) landscape 
changes and (4) direct or indirect displacements. 
While characteristics of rural gentrification have 
already been demonstrated with large-scale capital 
investment, exclusionary land leasing practices, in-
migration of high-income groups (employees)10 and 
rises in electricity prices, wind turbine development 
10 Most people migrating from Northern or Developed coun-
tries with wind companies jobs will resemble a high-income 
group.
has given rise to a new geography of rural gentrifica-
tion.
Wind turbines have driven up land and rent 
prices. A civil servant explains:
When the companies first came they 
arranged a rental contract and they came to 
look at the lands and they put in a clause 
that when the owners were ready to sell, they 
would have to sell to the companies. Then all 
of the prices went up more than 200 per cent, 
the price of land then was 4,000, 5000 pesos. 
Now it costs more than 50,000, 60,000 pesos 
[per square hectare].
Talking about the change in rent for an average 
dwelling, an ejidatario says, ‘[i]f the rent before was 
300 pesos, it is now 3,000 or 4,000 pesos—that is 
too much.’ This influx of people coming to plan and 
execute these wind projects, which was significant for 
the size of La Ventosa, had varying effects. The arrival 
of more people and money triggered a moto-taxi rush, 
with around 200 people buying moto-taxis, which 
now sit in people’s houses after wind park construc-
tion ended. ‘The companies use to pay more than 
what the people are used to here, but it had conse-
quences, because once the wind energy companies 
left, everyone wanted to charge the same amount [of 
money] to everyone,’ explained a moto-taxi driver. 
This trend subtly influenced restaurants to accom-
modate foreigners and to take advantage of the new 
money in town. Discussing cultural change, a human 
rights defender in Tehuantepec points out: ‘If you go 
to La Ventosa, there is a restaurant there and it used to 
be you could eat garnachas there, cocada, torta, coffee, 
but not anymore, now it is all gringo food. Light 
skinned people like you, more or less, go there and 
they have their menu there.’ While this change might 
be welcomed by some, to others it signifies a subtle 
colonial erasure. This is compounded by changes in 
quality of food. Emerging from a discussing about the 
‘sickness’ in the town one woman explains:
We think it is something coming from the 
food. Actually before we did not eat this kind 
of chicken, we ate chickens that were raised. 
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The pigs are the ones now that just eat [indus-
trial] feed and before that was not the case. 
Before we just ate animals that were roaming 
around, eating whatever they could find, like 
corn [stalks]. Now they are just purely eating 
feed made of chemicals and now people are 
getting sick—a lot. 
The shift from farming to ‘wind harvesting’ has 
had significant ripple effects, leading people to import 
food, slowly integrating people into food logistics 
that comes with new costs (Figure 6). ‘Every day the 
price of meat gets higher,’ a woman complains, telling 
me that it is over 140 pesos a kilo. This impact was 
multiplied by other significant cultural changes with 
the arrival of new people, habits and out-migration in 
search of work. 
Crime and Drug Consumption
‘[S]ince the arrival’ of wind energy projects, says 
a young women, ‘the problems that were already here 
started to grow with increases in drugs, in rent and 
food [prices].’ Crime and drugs grew with the arrival of 
the wind energy parks. Explaining the rise in crime in 
the town, people continually blamed it on ‘outsiders’ 
or ‘foreigners’ who think La Ventosa is rich because of 
the wind parks. ‘Because there are a lot people who 
have wind turbines on their land and they have higher 
earnings, there have been more robberies, assaults and 
people have broken into houses,’ explains a women, 
continuing: ‘So there are a lot of people coming 
from the outside, so since this town is so small we 
all knew each other, but not anymore.’ Twenty-two of 
sixty-three people see a rise in crime, while thirty felt 
there was a rise in drug consumption. A civil servant 
explains how this became a serious issue for the town:
It was about three years ago, when the 
high-school, the teachers, the workers and the 
staff of about 30 workers and three-hundred 
students demonstrated and went on strike 
and closed down the road. Because of drug 
consumption, the population was living in 
a situation of insecurity. Young people from 
outside the community, but from the 
region, were coming and selling drugs, 
selling coke [cocaine]. So we demon-
strated before the government so […] 
they would give us more security. And 
that these young people that would 
come and distribute drugs would retire 
and go away because they were practi-
cally poisoning our students.
I followed up by asking if this rise in 
drug use had ‘some relationship with the 
wind companies?’ The civil servant replied: 
‘Probably, yes. Because before there was 
delinquency, yes, but not so much like 
when the foreigners arrived.’ Stories kept 
emerging, specifically in interviews with 
mothers, about how they watched young 
people intermingle with wind company 
workers, who provided a gateway into drug 
use. Summarizing the situation, Aguila said: ‘The Jobs 
leave, but the drugs stay.’ The FDI and wind energy 
development created not only a direct rise in housing, 
electricity and food, but might support a micro version 
of Paley’s (2014) Drug War Capitalism theory—where 
economic growth correlates with drug consumption 
and production. Meanwhile, drug cartel related 
violence increased in the Istmo against the back drop 
of wind energy development and resistance.11
11   This raises further questions in this region regarding 
Fig. 6 Mural in Juchitán: ‘Autonomy and freedom of expression—My totopo will 
not have genetic modifications— cacique oppress you—Political parties divide 
you—Enterprises invade us.’ Photo by Author
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Out-Migration
Wind energy development triggered a duel 
process of revitalization for some, and ghettoization 
for the majority, intensifying pre-existing negative 
relationships and patterns within the town. This gets 
expressed in increased out-migration. The dramatic 
rise in prices, as well as the psychological and physical 
discomfort from living surrounded by wind parks, 
has intensified a poverty trap, resulting in indirect 
displacement related to land change.  Summarizing 
the situation a pastor explains:
People complain because they cannot 
work the land like they use to, even though 
they were given money for  the renting of the 
space, but they cannot work in agriculture. 
There is no more corn, beans, or watermelon. 
The ranchers are trying to make the best out 
of the little bit of grazing land they have, but 
there is no more production in agriculture.
This recent change from agriculture and livestock 
to wind energy appears to be slowly establishing de-
pendency on the importation of food from industrial 
sources, which reflect larger macro-economic trends 
in Mexico and insecurities associated with dissolving 
small-holder agriculture (Bello, 2009; Schutter, 2011; 
White et al., 2012; Wolford et al., 2013). This has 
widened the income-inequality gap in La Ventosa, 
allowing a kind of rural gentrification to flourish and 
encouraging existing out-migration for work. A man 
elucidates:
Yeah, much less work—less work. That is 
when people will start to migrate as far as the 
United States where people normally migrate 
to or maybe to other states or simply they 
will stay with the possibility of living day by 
day. For this reason it hurt their children in 
the educational field, they will not be able to 
continue their study because of the lack of 
resources. 
Paley’s (2014) Theory of Drug War Capitalism documenting 
how cartel violence terrorizes rebellious areas, which is used as 
a justification for the military to invade and further terrorize 
activists fighting development projects.
AD: Do you see this starting to happen 
now?
Yes.  Yes, I have a lot of friends who do 
not study anymore because their parents 
have ended up without work and they have 
migrated to other states and started working 
and plumbing in bathrooms and as low-paid 
workers in tourist zones where there is a little 
more work.
While these trends -- land change, rural gentrifica-
tion and out-migration – are already taking place, it 
is thought they will worsen in the near future. The 
extent of out-migration requires further investigation, 
but what is for sure is that the land owners and elites 
benefit, while others feel they ‘are still poor and now we 
are surrounded by wind turbines.’ Wind energy devel-
opment results in a series of dependencies, notably on 
the construction of more wind energy projects for the 
landless workers (Borras, et al., 2012), pitting them 
against their neighbouring coastal communities who 
not only survive from farming, fishing and selective 
engagements with the economy, but have taken up an 
insurrectionary stance against wind energy develop-
ment on the Laguna. Wind energy projects have far 
reaching social and environmental impacts draped in 
public relations, market opportunities and the hopes 
that they will mitigate ecological catastrophe that 
appears at worst unfounded or at best limited in La 
Ventosa.
Conclusion: Greening Inequality
The case of La Ventosa demonstrates two sub-
stantial impacts at the local level. La Ventosa exhibits 
typical outcomes associated with ecological distribu-
tion conflicts, such as local power inequalities, unequal 
distribution of benefits, and negative environmental 
impacts, but these features are exaggerated in cultur-
ally and context-specific ways, specifically with local 
political, agricultural and migration patterns. These 
features combine with the proximity of wind turbines 
to homes in  La Ventosa, which appears particularly 
problematic and unique, not only in terms of the dis-
comfort to local people living close by, but also with 
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the enclosure of the town that creates resource scarcity 
and triggers a type of rural gentrification. Wind energy 
in La Ventosa in construction, operation, and energy 
use, under the self-supply clause, becomes a step in 
the direction of privatization, commodification and 
grabbing of wind resources. Similarly, wind energy 
initiatives are promoting the spread of electrical, 
road, and concrete infrastructures to propel in this 
case transnational superstore chains, food processing 
corporations and mining companies – now Walmart 
owns the wind. This is justified globally as the ‘higher 
good’ to promote climate change mitigation, eco-
logical sustainability and economic growth. Investor 
companies continue to actively extract and process 
natural resources, which now extend to harnessing 
wind resources to process and sell plastics products, 
junk food, process steel and produce concrete for 
industrialized consumption and development. 
Meanwhile locally, industrial expansion in the name of 
mitigating anthropogenic climate change, serves as an 
economic stimulus in rural economies, but results in 
a type of rural gentrification that concentrates power, 
intensifies poverty and invites social immiseration. 
La Ventosa shows the complications associated 
with green grabbing that resonates with Borras et al., 
(2012) and Holmes (2014) who expand the defini-
tion of land/green grabbing and how these types of 
land acquisitions can happen through 
complicated and often sublet procedures, 
such as Coyotes, who are strategic in the 
way they approach people to broker and 
consolidate land deals for their employers, 
but also themselves. The source of com-
plications with green grabbing is the hope 
these projects generate. ‘Infrastructures’, 
Harvey and Knox (2012: 534) write, ‘can 
dazzle with the possibilities they hold—
glitter of progress, the lure of profit, the 
promise of circulation, movement and a 
better life.’ These hopes for an economi-
cally prosperous and more ecologically 
sound life, in the case of wind energy in La 
Ventosa, captivates the imaginations and 
desires of people both locally and abroad. 
However, local participation and benefit 
sharing is limited, where community wind 
park development would undoubtedly be preferable 
for local residents in La Ventosa (Oceransky, 2011). 
Meanwhile industrial-scale wind energy further 
entrenches the current trajectory of resource privatiza-
tion, exploitation and industrial progress, and their 
consequent social and ecological consequences. The 
green economy now emerges as a symbol in the ad-
vancement of environmental degradation and political 
control, rather than the reverse.
Discussing the principle of ‘lesser evil’ deployed 
by states in war, Eyal Weizman (2011: 10) writes, ‘less 
brutal measures are also those that may be more easily 
naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more 
frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may 
be reached cumulatively.’ The green economy is the 
lesser industrial evil, utilizing discursive technique of 
war to continue the proliferation of industrial waste 
in the name of climate change mitigation. This results 
in greater cumulative social and ecosystem alterations 
that edge toward destruction. The fruits of modernity 
continue to bloom as the mechanical flowers propel 
further the proliferation of industrialization, impover-
ishment and selective prosperity, suppressing not only 
the people resisting this trajectory, but also the alter-
natives to, and appropriations of, industrial develop-
ment so humans can live dignified, just lives and move 
towards more ecologically harmonious existence. 
Fig. 7 Downtown La Ventosa. Photo by Author
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